The Politics of Hate Crime: Neoliberal Vigilance, Vigilantism and the Question of Paedophilia by McDonald, David
www.crimejusticejournal.com	IJCJ&SD	2014	3(1):	68‐80	 	ISSN	2202–8005	
		
©	The	Author(s)	2014	
The	Politics	of	Hate	Crime:	Neoliberal	Vigilance,	Vigilantism	
and	the	Question	of	Paedophilia1	
David	McDonald	
University	of	Melbourne,	Australia	
	
	
	
Abstract	
This	article	examines	vigilantism	and	the	question	of	hate	crime.	Broader	shifts	in	penology	
have	occurred	in	tandem	with	changes	in	the	ways	in	which	child	sexual	abuse	has	come	to	
be	 understood.	 Using	 these	 shifts	 as	 a	 contextual	 backdrop,	 the	 article	 examines	 vigilance	
against	 the	 fear	 of	 crime	 where	 it	 manifests	 into	 vigilantism	 against	 real	 or	 perceived	
paedophiles.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 article	 attends	 to	 the	politics	 of	 hate	 crime:	namely,	whether	
these	actions	belong	within	the	confines	of	hate	crime	provisions	or,	alternatively,	whether	
such	 provisions	 should	 expressly	 exclude	 the	 category	 of	 paedophilia.	 In	 its	 entirety,	 the	
article	 interrogates	 the	 dimensions	 of	 disgust	 associated	 with	 paedophilia,	 and	 explores	
issues	arising	from	an	alignment	between	paedophilia	and	hate	crime.	
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Introduction	
Since	the	1970s,	public	recognition	of	child	sexual	abuse	has	gained,	in	the	words	of	Jenkins,	‘a	
new	sensibility’	(1998:	128).	Whereas	child	sexual	abuse	today	appears	to	present	self‐evident	
facts	 or	 orthodoxies	 –	 encompassing	 its	 widespread	 nature,	 the	 monstrosity	 of	 those	
responsible,	 and	 so	 on	 –	 this	 obscures	 the	 contingent	 and	 historically	 recent	 nature	 of	 such	
meanings.	One	notable	 consequence	of	 contemporary	 ideas	 surrounding	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 is	
the	unique	disgust	that	the	category	of	the	paedophile	elicits.2	Indeed,	it	may	now	be	said	that	
the	paedophile	has	become	our	contemporary	monster.	This	article	is	broadly	concerned	with	
the	consequences	that	arise	from	the	trajectory	of	disgust	through	which	paedophilia	has	come	
to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 category	 of	 dangerousness	 and	 abjection	 par	 excellence.	 Its	 focus	 is	 on	 the	
consequences	 which	 flow	 from	 the	 contemporary	 aversion	 that	 has	 accompanied	 this	 new	
sensibility	regarding	child	sexual	abuse.		
	
While	the	contemporary	fear	of	crime	is	of	course	not	unique,	it	has	gained	a	particular	salience	
as	a	product	of	the	new	sensibility	governing	public	understandings	of,	and	attitudes	towards,	
child	 sex	 offending.	 Occurring	 alongside	 other	 shifts	 in	 penology,	 the	 presence	 –	 real	 or	
rumoured	–	of	 child	sex	offenders	residing	 in	community	contexts	commonly	 leads	 to	 intense	
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fear,	 widespread	 media	 coverage,	 community	 outrage,	 and	 often	 vigilantism	 (Buttler	 and	
Anderson	2005a,	2005b,	2005c;	Buttler	and	Power	2005;	Critcher	2002;	Cross	2005;	Hodgson	
2005).	This	article	is	concerned	with	the	latter,	examining	instances	in	which	vigilance	against	
the	fear	of	crime	translates	into	vigilante	violence	against	actual	or	perceived	paedophiles.	Such	
violence	 can	 raise	 something	 of	 a	 conundrum	 for	 courts,	 legal	 scholars	 and	 others:	 namely,	
whether	 this	 should	 constitute	 a	 hate	 crime	 or,	 instead,	 whether	 paedophilia	 is	 a	 category	
inconsistent	with,	or	antipathetic	to,	the	protections	afforded	by	hate	crime	provisions	(Mason	
2009a;	 Mason	 and	 Dyer	 2012;	 McDonald	 2012).	 It	 is	 this	 conundrum	 that	 the	 article	
interrogates.		
	
Structurally,	 the	 article	 proceeds	 by	 first	 situating	 these	 concerns	 within	 historically	 recent	
shifts	 in	 criminal	 justice.	 Section	 one	 attends	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 broader	 structural	 shifts	
concerning	 the	 state’s	 commitment	 to	 manage	 or	 prevent	 crime	 have	 been	 replaced	 by	 a	
neoliberal	 context	 that	 prioritises	 principles	 including	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 incapacitation	
and	the	management	of	risk.	Section	two	examines	the	trajectory	of	disgust	through	which	child	
sexual	abuse	has	 increasingly	been	 recognised	 as	widespread	and,	 associated	with	 this	 trend,	
subsequently	 become	 the	 subject	 of	 greater	 fear	 and	 aversion.	 The	 remainder	 of	 the	 article	
moves	on	to	more	substantively	engage	with	some	of	 the	unintended	consequences	 that	arise	
from	 this	 contemporary	 scenario:	 specifically,	 instances	 in	which	vigilance	 against	 the	 fear	of	
crime	 translates	 into	 vigilantism	against	 ‘paedophilies’,	 as	well	 as	 the	politics	 of	 naming	 such	
acts	 as	 hate	 crimes.	While	 the	 article	 proceeds	 from	 the	 recognition	 that	 child	 sexual	 assault	
demands	 condemnation,	 it	 seeks	 to	 interrogate	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 prevailing	 ideas	 about	
paedophilia	 may	 contain	 unintended	 consequences	 which	 threaten	 to	 obscure	 the	 more	
normative	or	routine	scenarios	in	which	child	sexual	assault	occurs.	
	
Neoliberalism	and	the	punitive	turn	
In	 his	 authoritative	 account	 of	 historically	 recent	 shifts	 in	 penology,	 David	 Garland	 (2001)	
charts	 the	 movement	 away	 from	 the	 penal‐welfare	 model	 towards	 a	 renewed	 embrace	 of	
punitiveness	 and	 individual	 responsibilisation	 against	 the	 fear	 of	 crime.	 In	 the	 1970s,	 with	
political	actors	and	government	agencies	struck	by	the	uncomfortable	reality	of	rising	rates	of	
crime,	a	belief	in	or	commitment	to	the	state’s	capacity	to	control	crime	and	promote	security	
was	thereby	diminished.	The	result	was	a	subsequent	decline	in	a	welfare‐oriented	response	to	
crime,	 replaced	 by	 penal	 goals	 including	 deterrence,	 retribution,	 incapacitation	 and	 the	
management	 of	 risk.	 At	 their	 heart,	 these	 principles	 underscore	 a	 subtle	 though	 important	
reconceptualisation	of	the	 individual	subject.	With	the	state	having	abrogated	its	commitment	
to	 prevent	 crime	 or	 rehabilitate	 criminal	 actors,	 this	 has	 subsequently	 been	 replaced	 by	 an	
emphasis	upon	 individual	 autonomy	and	 the	 responsibility	of	 offenders,	 alongside	 a	 renewed	
vigour	 in	 community	 deterrence	 initiatives	 that	 reflect	 the	 neoliberal	 state’s	 reorientation	 of	
criminal	justice.		
	
Perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	 these	 penal	 shifts	 have	 occurred	 in	 tandem	 with	 the	 rise	 of	
neoliberalism,	 which	 has	 recalibrated	 the	 relation	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	 state	 more	
generally.	Key	components	of	neoliberalism	include	free	trade,	privatisation,	deregulation,	and	
retrenchment	of	the	welfare	state	(Brown	2011:	130).	These	moves	may	mark	a	reorientation	of	
the	state;	however,	this	is	not	to	say	that	it	has	withered	away	when	it	comes	to	crime.	While	the	
weight	that	the	discipline	of	criminology	has	afforded	the	state	has	fluctuated	–	in	large	part	as	a	
result	of	a	shift	in	emphasis	away	from	‘late	capitalism’	to	‘late	modernity’	–	the	state	persists	as	
a	site	of	significance	in	its	more	recent	neoliberal	incarnation	(Hallsworth	and	Lea	2012:	190).3	
As	Wacquant	demonstrates,	the	decline	of	welfare	has	been	accompanied	by	progressively	more	
severe	 responses	 to	 criminality	 (2009).	 For	 him,	 this	 is	 not	 an	 accident	 of	 neoliberalism,	 but	
central	 to	 its	 very	 architecture.	 The	 trope	 of	 individual	 responsibility	 that	 neoliberalism	 so	
explicitly	espouses	requires	an	intrusive	and	expansive	penal	apparatus	in	order	to	manage	and	
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contain	 the	 insecurity	 and	 inequality	 that	 is	 compounded	 by	 neoliberalism	 (2009:	 306‐7).	 So	
while	 the	 state	 has	 on	 one	 level	 absolved	 itself	 of	 its	 prior	 commitment	 to	 criminality	 and	
community	safety,	at	the	same	time	it	has	ushered	in	much	more	punitive	sentences	that	reflect	
neoliberal	ideals	of	individual	responsibility	at	the	expense	of	structural	and	other	factors.	The	
result	 has	 been	 increased	 rates	 of	 mass	 imprisonment,	 longer	 sentences,	 and	 a	 range	 of	
measures	that	were	arguably	inconceivable	previously.	
	
This	‘new	punitiveness’,	which	cannot	be	isolated	to	any	one	jurisdiction,	has	thus	functioned	to	
legitimise	 significant	 changes	 in	 criminal	 justice,	 and	 the	 treatment	 of	 convicted	 offenders	
(Brown	 2011;	 Brown	 and	 Pratt	 2000;	 Pratt	 2000,	 2006,	 2007,	 2008;	 Pratt	 and	 Clark	 2005;	
Simon	1998,	2007).	Governments	now	do	not	simply	absolve	themselves	from	a	commitment	to	
manage	 or	 limit	 criminality:	 instead,	 punitive	 criminal	 justice	 has	 become	 a	 crucial	 means	
through	 which	 governments,	 both	 left	 and	 right,	 are	 increasingly	 mandated	 through	 their	
expressed	 commitment	 to	 govern	 through	 crime	 (Simon	 2007).	 As	 Wacqaunt	 observes,	
neoliberalism	is	a	key	factor	underpinning	this:	 ‘the	root	cause	of	the	punitive	turn’,	he	writes,	
‘is	…	neoliberalism,	a	project	that	can	be	indifferently	embraced	by	politics	of	the	Right	or	Left’	
(2009:	 305).	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 fear	 of	 crime	 has	 afforded	 governments	 of	 various	 political	
persuasions	 a	 means	 to	 use	 crime	 as	 a	 pragmatic	 vehicle	 through	 which	 politics	 can	 be	
effectively	played	out.	This	has	occurred	in	distinct	contrast	to,	and	isolation	from,	the	social	and	
other	costs	that	may	accompany	this.			
	
The	 consequences	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 project	 have	 inevitably	 led	 to	 particular	 shifts	 within	
communities.	 This	 is	 not	 simply	 an	 increase	 in	 inequality	 and	 insecurity.	 With	 the	 state	 no	
longer	 committed	 to	 its	 responsibility	 in	 managing	 crime,	 the	 consequence	 has	 been	 a	
pronounced	sense	of	responsibilisation	regarding	the	fear	of	crime.	As	I	go	on	to	argue,	this	has	
led	 to	 distinct	 and	 troubling	 consequences	 within	 community	 contexts.	 This	 has	 particularly	
been	the	case	when	it	comes	to	‘paedophiles’,	owing	in	large	part	to	the	unique	disgust	that	such	
offenders	have	come	to	solicit.	It	is	to	this	concern	that	I	now	turn.		
	
A	trajectory	of	disgust		
In	the	introductory	section	of	this	article	I	referred	to	a	new	sensibility	regarding	the	problem	of	
child	 sexual	 abuse.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 develop	 this	 claim,	 demonstrating	 the	 shifting	 nature	 in	
which	 such	 harm	 has	 been	 shaped	 and,	 ultimately,	 contemporaneously	 conceived.	 Philip	
Jenkins’	Moral	Panic:	Changing	Conceptions	of	the	Child	Molester	in	Modern	America	compellingly	
attests	to	this	trend,	charting	periodic	cycles	that	have	governed	intelligibility	concerning	child	
sexual	 abuse.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article,	 his	 account	 reveals	 two	 points	 of	 particular	
significance:	first,	that	ideas	about	child	sexual	abuse	are	not	objective	reflections	of	the	nature	
of	such	harm;	and	second,	that	recent	debates	associated	with	this	tend	to	predominantly	focus	
on	the	most	exceptional	or	extreme	scenarios	(such	as	child	killers),	which	in	reality	constitute	
an	incredibly	small	proportion	of	homicide	offences,	and	sexual	offences	more	generally	(1998:	
11).	 This	 latter	 observation	 assists	 in	 coming	 to	 understand	 how	 and	why	 the	 contemporary	
fear	and	fixation	upon	the	paedophile	has	gained	such	traction.	
	
Another	factor	underpinning	this	relates	to	important	social	changes	occurring	from	roughly	the	
1970s	onwards.	Around	this	time,	feminist	debates	about	sexual	violence	increasingly	began	to	
broaden	their	analysis	to	the	problems	of	incest	and	child	sexual	abuse	(Angelides	2004).	This	
was	 an	 important	 and	overdue	 dialogue	 that	 feminists	 during	 this	 time	must	 be	 credited	 for.	
However,	 while	 these	 moves	 remain	 beyond	 reproach,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article,	 of	
significance	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 they	 have	 inadvertently	 assisted	 to	 usher	 in	 a	 new	 era	
marked	by	a	consensus	which	regards	the	paedophile	as	a	unique	object	of	hate.		
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To	regard	the	contemporary	aversion	for	paedophilia	simply	as	a	product	of	disgust,	however,	is	
to	overlook	the	particular	fascination	that	also	underpins	this.	As	Kincaid	writes,	‘few	stories	in	
our	 culture	 right	 now	 are	 as	 popular	 as	 those	 of	 child	 molesting’	 (1998:	 3).	 What	 this	
underscores	 is	 the	 particular	 allure	 that	 accompanies	 such	 stories.	 While	 broad	 social	
recognition	of	the	problem	of	child	sexual	abuse	is	without	qualification	positive,	particularly	in	
contrast	to	previous	contexts	in	which	it	was	often	denied	or	overlooked,	or	where	victims	were	
themselves	 held	 as	blameworthy,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	new	contemporary	 ‘consensus’	 is	
beyond	interrogation.	As	Kincaid	asks,	‘why	do	we	generate	these	stories	and	not	others?	What	
rewards	do	they	offer?	Who	profits	 from	their	circulation,	and	who	pays	the	price?’	(1998:	3).	
The	answer	to	this	last	question	–	who	pays	the	price	–	is,	I	would	contend,	paedophiles,	as	well	
as	others	who	are	marked	out	as	different,	and	perceived	to	fit	the	profile	of	such	offenders.		
	
One	way	 in	which	 the	price	of	 the	 contemporary	orthodoxy	of	paedophilia	 as	monstrous	 and	
exceptional	can	be	witnessed	is	the	raft	of	legal	measures	that	such	offenders	are	increasingly	
subjected	to.	Indeed,	broader	shifts	in	criminal	justice	have	been	felt	particularly	keenly	when	it	
comes	 to	 paedophiles	 and	 other	 ‘serious	 sex	 offenders’.	 Initiatives	 such	 as	 sex	 offender	
registries,	 working	 with	 children	 checks,	 post‐sentence	 preventative	 detention,	 and	 post‐
sentence	monitoring	and	supervision	all	 crystallise,	on	one	 level,	 into	more	generalised	penal	
and	 legislative	 shifts.	 However	 they	 also	 attest	 to	 the	 particular	 trajectory	 of	 disgust	 charted	
here.	Perhaps	more	importantly	–	and	concerning	–	is	the	fact	that	the	measures	such	offenders	
are	 increasingly	 subjected	 to	 often	 depart	 from	 many	 long	 held	 legal	 principles,	 including	
finality	 of	 sentence,	 retrospective	 punishment,	 and	 so	 on	 (Douglas	 2008;	Keyzer	 and	O’Toole	
2006;	Keyzer,	Pereira	and	Southwood	2004;	McSherry	2005,	2007;	Warner	2003).	 In	 spite	of	
this,	 they	 have	 generally	 been	 met	 with	 comparatively	 little	 opposition,	 and	 thus	 cannot	 be	
understood	 in	 isolation	 from	the	seemingly	universal	consensus	surrounding	 the	 ‘unique’	 risk	
posed	by	such	offenders.		
	
Vigilance	as	vigilantism	
These	broader	shifts	in	penology,	alongside	attitudes	associated	with	child	sex	offenders,	have	
led	 to	–	or	at	 the	 least	been	accompanied	by	–	new	and	unique	attitudes	within	communities	
about	their	own	responsibility	when	it	comes	to	criminality	that	may	occur	in	their	proximity.	
This	 has	 been	 devastatingly	 and	 spectacularly	 demonstrated	when	 it	 comes	 to	 ‘paedophiles’,	
particularly	with	regard	 to	 instances	 in	which	vigilance	against	 the	 fear	of	crime	manifests	or	
translates	into	vigilantism.	
	
The	 complex	 relationship	 between	 vigilance	 and	 vigilantism	 was	 infamously	 borne	 out	
following	 the	News	of	 the	World’s	 campaign	 for	 ‘Sarah’s	 Law’	 in	 July	 2000	 (Bell	 2002;	 Evans	
2003;	Lawler	2002;	Williams	and	Thompson	2004).	This	campaign,	in	which	child	sex	offenders	
were	publicly	named	and	shamed	by	the	newspaper,	followed	the	death	of	seven‐year‐old	Sarah	
Payne	at	the	hands	of	Roy	Whiting,	who	had	prior	child	sex	offence	convictions.	The	campaign	
led	to	significant	community	unrest,	including	rioting,	widespread	property	damage	and	clashes	
with	police,	most	notoriously	in	the	Portsmouth	housing	estate	in	Paulsgrove	but	also	in	areas	
in	 Plymouth,	 Berkshire,	 Manchester,	 London	 and	 Wales	 (Bell	 2002;	 Evans	 2003).	 As	 Evans	
astutely	 observes,	 these	 events	 cannot	 be	 understood	 in	 isolation	 from	 the	 then‐Blair	
government’s	dual	approach	to	sex	offenders	which	coalesced	neoliberal	governance	with	penal	
populism:	 a	 central	 outcome	 of	 this	 coalescence,	 she	 writes,	 ‘is	 the	 collapse	 of	 a	meaningful	
distinction	between	vigilance	and	vigilantism’	(2003:	165).	
	
In	the	context	of	these	events	in	the	early	2000s,	it	was	the	important	‘campaigning’	role	played	
by	one	newspaper	that	helped	foster	fear	and	vigilante	violence.	However,	 the	fear	of	crime	is	
often	experienced	as	so	pronounced,	and	 the	need	 for	vigilance	so	persistent,	 that	violence	of	
this	 nature	 continues	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 explicit	 agenda	driven	by	media	 agencies.	 In	 July	
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2013,	 Bijan	 Ebrahimi	 –	 a	 44‐year‐old	 Bristol	 man	 –	 was	 beaten,	 set	 alight	 and	 murdered.	
Subsequent	accounts	of	his	death	suggest	his	head	was	 repeatedly	stamped	upon	prior	 to	his	
body	 being	 burned.	 Uncertainty	 persists	 as	 to	whether	 he	was	 deceased	 at	 this	 point	 or	 not.	
According	to	his	neighbours,	he	was	a	paedophile.	They	had	witnessed	him	taking	photographs	
of	 local	 young	people,	 prompting	 a	 complaint	 to	police.	One	 of	 his	 killers,	 father	 of	 three	Lee	
James,	had	called	police	in	the	days	prior,	warning	that	he	would	‘sort	it	out	himself’	if	they	did	
not	intervene	(Peachy	2013:	no	pagination).	
	
When	police	did	finally	intervene,	it	was	to	arrest	Ebrahimi	and	take	him	away	for	questioning.	
Upon	this,	locals	gathered	to	chant	‘paedo,	paedo’.	On	inspection	of	his	camera,	the	reality	of	the	
conflict	 within	 this	 public	 housing	 complex	 was	 revealed.	 Ebrahimi	 had	 been	 taking	
photographs	of	 locals	damaging	his	garden	hanging	pots,	which	he	himself	had	complained	to	
police	about,	and	explained	 that	he	had	 taken	 the	 images	as	evidence.	Ebrahimi’s	 family	have	
since	described	him	as	‘a	quiet,	disabled	man	whose	only	joys	in	life	came	from	his	horticultural	
interests	and	his	cat’	(cited	in	Farmer	2013:	no	pagination).	They	also	emphasised	that	‘he	was	a	
caring,	 loving	 and	unselfish	man.	He	was	 an	 excellent	 uncle	 and	 a	warm,	 supportive	 brother’	
(cited	 in	 Farmer	 2013:	 no	 pagination).	Marked	 out	 as	 different	 by	 his	 neighbours,	 his	 prized	
garden	 became	 the	 subject	 of	 routine	 vandalism.	 His	 efforts	 to	 thwart	 this,	 and	 also	 support	
police	 in	 doing	 so,	 ultimately	 led	 to	 his	 erroneous	 designation	 as	 a	 paedophile.	 While	
independent	inquiries	into	the	actions	of	police	are	currently	underway,	it	appears	that,	in	the	
context	of	the	return	to	his	home	by	investigating	officers	and	in	the	absence	of	any	explanation	
to	his	neighbours	 to	 rectify	 their	unfounded	suspicions,	 two	young	men	 felt	entitled	 in	 taking	
the	law	into	their	own	hands.	Having	been	returned	home	on	the	Friday	evening,	he	was	dead	
by	the	early	hours	of	Sunday.		
	
The	 two	 men	 responsible	 for	 Ebrahimi’s	 deaths	 have	 since	 been	 convicted	 and	 sentenced.	
Regardless	of	 this	 formal	outcome,	 the	 case	 is	without	question	devastating.	Notwithstanding	
this,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article	 its	 significance	 lies	 in	 the	 parallels	 it	 reveals	 with	 other	
instances	in	which	communities	have	become	emboldened	to	resort	to	vigilantism	where	they	
believe	a	child	sex	offender	resides	in	their	proximity.	
	
Another	 relatively	 recent	 case	 –	 albeit	 far	 less	 devastating	 in	 its	 consequences	 –	 was	 heard	
before	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 Court	 of	 Criminal	 Appeal	 in	 2007.4	 In	 this	 case	 the	 court	 was	
required	 to	 give	 consideration	 to	 whether	 such	 acts	 –	 vigilantism	 motivated	 by	 perceived	
paedophilia	 –	may	be	considered	hate	 crimes.	 	 In	2005,	Darren	Brian	Dunn	and	 Ibrahim	Arja	
were	neighbours	in	a	complex	of	public	housing	units	in	the	Sydney	suburb	of	Riverwood.	In	the	
early	hours	of	29	August	2005,	while	Arja	was	overseas,	Dunn	set	fire	to	chairs	on	the	porch	of	
Arja’s	unit.	The	fire	destroyed	the	chairs,	as	well	as	the	window	of	the	unit’s	front	room.	On	30	
October	2005,	around	two	months	after	the	initial	fire,	Dunn	again	set	fire	to	Arja’s	unit.	Though	
Arja	had	returned	from	overseas,	he	was	not	home	at	the	time.		This	fire	resulted	in	significant	
damage	to	the	complex	of	units,	which	were	subsequently	deemed	uninhabitable.		
	
Although	Dunn	did	not	give	evidence	at	trial,	his	sentencing	judge	sought	to	establish	a	motive	
for	his	attacks.	In	doing	so,	the	judge	relied	on	evidence	provided	by	a	police	informant	about	a	
conversation	he	had	with	Dunn,	along	with	a	report	provided	to	the	court	by	a	psychiatrist	for	
the	prisoner.	 The	police	 informant	 gave	 evidence	 that,	 three	days	 after	 the	 second	 fire,	Dunn	
stated	that	he	had	lit	the	fire	because	Arja	was	a	‘rock	spider’.	This	term	is	predominantly	used	
by	 prisoners	 to	 hierarchically	 distinguish	 paedophiles	 from	 other	 imprisoned	 offenders.	 The	
psychiatrist	further	recorded	a	conversation	in	which	Dunn	stated	that	the	fires	were	intended	
as	a	‘scare	tactic’	because	Arja	was	a	‘rock	spider’.5	
	
While	Dunn’s	belief	that	Arja	was	a	paedophile	was	found	to	be	erroneous,	the	sentencing	judge	
held	 that	 a	 significant	 factor	 motivating	 Dunn	 was	 his	 ‘feelings	 of	 antipathy	 towards	 his	
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neighbour	 Mr	 Arja	 who	 he	 believed	 without	 justification	 at	 all,	 was	 a	 paedophile’.6	 These	
findings,	the	judge	ruled,	constituted	a	significant	aggravating	factor	in	line	with	s	21A(2)(h)	of	
the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	(NSW)	1999.	This	section	provides	that	sentencing	judges	
may	 have	 regard	 to	 whether	 an	 offence	 was	 motivated	 by	 hatred	 for	 or	 prejudice	 against	 a	
group	of	people	to	which	the	offender	believed	the	victim	belonged.	Specifically,	 it	constitutes	
the	 means	 by	 which	 New	 South	 Wales	 courts	 distinguish	 hate	 crimes	 from	 other	 forms	 of	
offending	behaviour.		
	
Dunn	 appealed	 against	 this	 sentencing,	 requiring	 the	 Court	 of	 Criminal	 Appeal	 to	 give	
consideration	to	whether	paedophilia	may	constitute	grounds	for	hate	crime.	The	court’s	ruling	
was	unambiguous.	It	found	that:	
	
Applying	s	21	A(2)(h)	it	is	clear	that	the	offences	come	fairly	and	squarely	within	
it.	 The	 offence	 was	 motivated	 by	 a	 hatred	 or	 prejudice	 against	 Mr	 Arja	 solely	
because	 the	 applicant	 believed	 him	 to	 be	 a	 member	 of	 a	 particular	 group,	 ie	
paedophiles.	 The	 examples	 given	 in	 parentheses7	 are	merely	 that,	 ie	 examples,	
they	 do	 not	 comprise	 an	 exhaustive	 list	 of	 the	 groups	 envisaged	 by	 the	
subsection.8	
	
The	 consequence	 of	 this	 finding	 was	 the	 recognition	 that	 a	 belief	 that	 an	 individual	 is	 a	
paedophile	is	sufficient	to	constitute	an	aggravating	factor	in	sentencing:	that	is	to	say,	the	belief	
an	 individual	 is	 a	 paedophile	 may	 give	 an	 act	 the	 character	 of	 a	 hate	 crime.	 It	 is	 this	 case’s	
reception,	and	the	politics	that	underpin	this,	that	occupy	the	remainder	of	this	article.	
	
The	politics	of	hate	crime	
For	the	purposes	of	this	article,	the	reception	this	judgment	has	received	is	of	significance.	Legal	
scholar	Gail	Mason	has	written	 extensively	 on	hate	 crime	 (2001,	 2007,	 2009a,	 2009b,	 2009c,	
2012).9	In	response	to	this	case,	Mason	writes	that	‘this	decision	appears	to	be	a	world	first.	The	
protection	 offered	 by	 hate	 crime	 laws	 has	 never	 before	 been	 extended	 to	 paedophiles	 as	 a	
group’	(2009a:	254).	Elsewhere	she	describes	it	as	a	‘provocative	and	unique	decision’	(2009b:	
337).	Writing	in	the	context	of	the	recent	history	of	hate	crime	as	a	concept,	Mason	emphasises	
how	 it	 has	 typically	 been	 deployed	 in	 order	 to	 place	 ‘discriminatory	 violence	 on	 the	 public	
agenda	 as	 a	 recognisable	 social	 problem’	 (2009a:	 254).	 Hate	 crime	 laws,	 she	 argues,	 aim	 to	
‘make	 a	 broad	moral	 claim	 that	 prejudice	 is	wrong	 and	 thereby	 reinforce	 prosocial	 values	 of	
tolerance	 and	 respect	 for	 marginalised	 and	 disadvantaged	 groups’	 (2009a:	 254).	 Because	 of	
their	 expressive	 function	 in	 denouncing	 intolerance	 and	 violence	 toward	 traditionally	
underprivileged	groups,	‘hate	crime	laws	have	tended	to	mimic	the	kinds	of	“social	fissure	lines”	
also	protected	under	discrimination	law:	race,	religion,	ethnicity,	colour,	age,	sexuality,	physical	
and	mental	disability	and	so	on’	(2009a:	254‐5).	
	
If	prejudice	is	the	crucial	factor	that	hate	crime	laws	seek	to	address,	then,	according	to	Mason,	
this	 prejudice	 must	 be	 irrational	 or	 unjustifiable:	 ‘prejudice	 by	 very	 definition	 denotes	 an	
irrational	 or	 unjustifiably	 negative	 attitude	 towards	 members	 of	 a	 particular	 group’	 (2009a:	
255).	However,	 she	 regards	paedophilia	 as	 something	of	a	 limit	when	 it	 comes	 to	hate	 crime.		
Whereas	other	forms	of	prejudice	are	irrational	or	unjustified,	this	attitude	lacks	these	qualities	
when	applied	to	the	paedophile.	As	she	writes:	
	
Adults	who	engage	in	sex	with	children	inflict	a	clear	and	identifiable	harm	upon	
others,	namely	children.	Condemnation	of	such	behaviour	is	neither	unwarranted	
nor	 unjustified.	 Indeed,	 many	 would	 argue	 we	 have	 a	 moral	 imperative	 to	
denounce	exploitative	conduct	of	this	nature.	(Mason	2009a:	255)	
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Elsewhere	Mason	 has	 examined	 the	 political	 dimensions	 that	 can	 underpin	what	 is	 or	 is	 not	
labelled	 as	 hate	 crime.	 In	 her	 compelling	 analysis	 of	 the	 Snowtown	 case,10	 she	 highlights	 the	
ways	 in	which	hate	 crime	can	engender	emotional	 thinking,	 including	compassion	 for	victims	
and	 disgust	 for	 perpetrators	 (2007).	 As	 she	 argues	 here,	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 an	 act	 is	
labelled	a	hate	crime	is	not	simply	determined	by	whether	it	meets	a	requisite	legal	definition.	
Drawing	on	Nils	Christie’s	concept	of	the	‘ideal	victim’	(1986),	in	the	context	of	Snowtown	she	
demonstrates	how	a	 sense	 of	moral	 failure	on	 the	part	 of	 victims	precludes	 a	broader	public	
recognition	 of	 these	 acts	 as	 constituting	 a	 hate	 crime.	 Her	 examination	 of	 the	 legal	 case	
alongside	 public	 reportage	 reveals	 that,	 while	 hatred	 towards	 homosexuals	 and	 paedophiles	
was	 the	primary	 (albeit	not	exclusive)	motive	 for	 these	deaths,	because	of	 the	broader	moral	
judgment	that	is	socially	ascribed	to	homosexuality	and	paedophilia,	this	case	has	rarely	if	ever	
been	properly	labelled	as	a	hate	crime.	
	
Returning	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Dunn,	 for	 Mason	 prejudice	 against	 paedophilia	 is	 not	 irrational	 or	
unjustified,	 therein	precluding	such	vigilante	violence	 from	being	understood	as	a	category	of	
hate	crime.	While	I	am	broadly	indebted	to	Mason’s	extensive	and	insightful	work	on	hate	crime,	
in	this	article	I	offer	a	critical	departure	from	these	arguments.	This	departure	arises	first	from	
the	assumption	that	hatred	of	paedophilia	is	neither	irrational	nor	unjustified;	and	second,	from	
the	need,	I	would	emphasise,	to	distinguish	between	social	attitudes	regarding	paedophilia	and	
the	phenomenon	of	child	sexual	assault	itself.		
	
The	cultural	aversion	to	paedophilia	 is	not	a	direct	correlation	of	 the	objective	reality	of	child	
sexual	assault.	As	Jenkins	(1998)	observes,	attitudes	towards	child	sexual	assault	are	cyclical	in	
nature.	 In	spite	of	 this,	 the	current	 formulation	of	child	sexual	exploitation	 is	presented	as	an	
evolutionary	 stage	 in	 social	 development:	 whereas	 it	 has	 previously	 been	 conceived	 as	 a	
problem	 of	 overstatement	 or	 infrequency,	 the	 current	 and	 widespread	 acceptance	 of	 child	
sexual	 assault	 as	 a	 problem	 is	 marked	 by	 its	 statistical	 prevalence.	 Specifically,	 the	
contemporary	 orthodoxy	 is	 that	 child	 sexual	 assault	 is	 an	 overwhelmingly	 prevalent	
phenomenon,	and	that	this	orthodoxy	is	a	measure	of	its	reality.	Further,	to	the	extent	that	the	
‘reality’	of	child	sexual	assault	is	conceived	as	a	prevalent	one,	it	follows	that	the	fear	or	panic	
attached	to	it	is	amplified.	
	
Reading	this	as	a	cyclical	pattern	over	different	historical	periods,	linked	to	an	overstated	fear	or	
panic,	Jenkins	draws	on	Stanley	Cohen’s	authoritative	work	on	moral	panics	(1973).	For	Jenkins,	
this	assists	 in	understanding	how	concern	about	 child	molestation	has	 fluctuated	widely	over	
the	 twentieth	 century.	For	him,	 these	 changes	 reflect	 the	 shifting	 role	of	 interest	 groups	over	
time,	 such	 as	 child	 protection	 movements,	 feminists,	 psychiatrists	 and	 therapists,	 as	 well	 as	
politicians	and	other	officials.	As	he	writes,	 ‘this	 impressive	 range	of	 interest	 groups	 stood	 to	
benefit	from	claims	about	threats	to	children,	and	the	number	of	beneficiaries	increased	as	each	
crisis	developed’	(1998:	219;	see	also	Angelides	2004).	
	
So	while	increased	recognition	of	the	prevalence	of,	and	repudiation	for,	child	sex	offending	is	to	
be	welcomed,	this	should	not	preclude	a	critique	of	the	manner	in	which	paedophilia	has	come	
to	constitute	monstrosity	and	hatred	par	excellence.	Following	Jenkins’	identification	of	a	moral	
panic	 surrounding	 paedophilia,	 this	 panic	 itself	 may	 be	 misplaced	 or	 out	 of	 proportion.	 By	
delegitimising	the	potential	for	paedophilia	to	encompass	a	category	of	hate	crime,	recognition	
of	 the	 irrational	or	unjustified	moral	panic	 surrounding	paedophilia	 is	 foreclosed.	 Indeed,	 the	
phenomenon	 of	 vigilantism	 against	 paedophiles	 is	 one	 key	 consequence	 of	 our	 moral	 panic	
surrounding	the	category	of	the	paedophile.	While	Mason	recognises	that	such	vigilantism	is	not	
warranted,	I	would	nonetheless	maintain	that	vigilantism	arises	from	the	same	site	of	hate	itself.	
It	is	difficult	in	practice	to	decry	vigilantism	during	which	time	we	delegitimise	the	potential	for	
retributive	and/or	vigilante	violence	on	the	basis	of	paedophilia	to	be	legally	defined	as	a	hate	
crime.		
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Hate	as	disavowal	
With	 this	 in	 mind,	 here	 I	 explore	 in	 further	 detail	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 paedophilia	 extends	
beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 intellectual	 defence	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 hate	 crime	 provisions.	 To	 be	
clear,	 the	argument	 that	 follows	 is	not	a	defence	of	paedophilia.	 Instead,	 it	 is	a	rebuttal	 to	 the	
claim	that	vigilantism	directed	towards	real	or	perceived	paedophiles	cannot	and	should	not	be	
encompassed	 within	 respective	 jurisdictional	 hate	 crime	 provisions.	 A	 more	 explicit	
interrogation	 is	required	of	 the	complex	reasons	why	 individuals	 feel	emboldened	to	 take	the	
law	into	their	own	hands	with	such	violent	outcomes	in	the	 first	place.	As	Evans	writes	in	the	
context	 of	 the	 events	 at	 the	Paulsgrove	 estate	 in	2000,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 ask	 ‘the	question	of	
what	actions	mean	to	the	particular	“communities”	and	individuals	who	do	get	involved’	(2003:	
172;	 original	 emphasis;	 see	 also	 Bell	 2002;	 Clarke	 1999;	Maruna,	Matravers	 and	 King	 2004).	
Indeed,	 scholarship	 on	 hate	 crime	 –	 some	 of	Mason’s	 included	 –	 demonstrates	 the	 powerful	
possibilities	for	affiliation	and	affection	that	arise	from	acts	of	hate.	
	
In	her	cultural	history	of	fear,	Bourke	writes	that	‘when	we	identify	the	emotion	of	fear	it	is	our	
fear	that	concerns	us.	It	is	the	fear	of	something	that	may	befall	us,	rather	than	fear	for	others,	
those	people	on	whom	we	inflict	suffering’	(2005:	x;	original	emphasis).	Following	this,	 fear	–	
and	hate,	I	would	add	–	functions	according	to	an	exclusionary	dynamic.	Importantly,	however,	
hate	and	fear	are	productive	in	nature.	As	Ahmed	insightfully	observes,	hate	organises	bodies:	it	
produces	affiliations	and	identifications	through	the	disavowal	of	other	bodies	(2001).	This	can	
particularly	be	witnessed	 in	 the	context	of	vigilante	violence	against	paedophiles.	 Similarly,	 it	
can	also	be	witnessed	in	the	desire	to	foreclose	hate	crime	as	incompatible	with	paedophilia.	On	
one	 level	 this	 may	 appear	 reasonable,	 perhaps	 ideal.	 But	 to	 consider	 it	 in	 these	 terms	 is	 to	
overlook	the	fact	that	this	disavowal	entails	political	consequences.	It	designates	certain	bodies	
as	emblematic	of	child	sexual	assault,	at	 the	same	 time	that	 it	also	neglects	 to	designate	other	
bodies	as	such.		
	
In	 this	 respect,	 there	 is	 a	 conceptual	 and	political	 imperative,	 I	would	argue,	 to	 recognise	 the	
distinction	between	paedophilia	and	child	sexual	assault.	Throughout	this	article	I	have	used	the	
terms	 ‘child	 sexual	 assault’	 and	 ‘paedophilia’	 with	 as	 much	 precision	 as	 possible.	 One	
consequence	of	the	moral	panic	surrounding	the	paedophile	is	to	cast	this	category,	or	type	of	
person,	 as	 emblematic	 of,	 and	 synonymous	 with,	 child	 sexual	 abuse.	 However	 the	 alarming	
prevalence	of	child	sexual	assault	demands	that	the	category	of	the	paedophile	cannot	stand	in	
for	 this	 troubling	 –	 and	 troublingly	 frequent	 –	 phenomenon.	 Through	 our	 aversion	 to	 the	
paedophile,	I	argue	that	we	lose	sight	of	the	much	more	routine	reality	of	child	sexual	assault.	In	
this	respect	my	argument	parallels	Hannah	Arendt’s	in	the	context	of	the	Adolph	Eichmann	trial	
(1963).	 For	 Arendt,	 what	 characterised	 Eichmann	 was	 not	 his	 monstrosity	 or	 extraordinary	
exceptionality.	Instead,	it	was	his	very	ordinariness,	his	banality.	For	her,	this	is	what	made	his	
crimes	much	more	terrifying.	 In	the	same	way,	 I	would	suggest	 that	our	 increased	 fixation	on	
‘the	paedophile’	functions	to	disavow	the	routine	or	much	more	prevalent	nature	of	child	sexual	
assault,	therein	losing	sight	of	those	child	sex	offenders	amongst	us,	or	who	indeed	may	be	us.		
	
In	 this	 respect,	what	 is	often	 left	unspoken	within	 the	cultural	aversion	 for	paedophilia	 is	 the	
complex	relation	of	self	and	other	that	underpins	this	disgust.	Broadly	speaking,	debates	about	
criminal	 justice	 tend	 by	 their	 nature	 to	 construct	 particular	 communities	 and,	 in	 doing	 so,	
accord	to	an	exclusionary	logic.	As	Alison	Young	observes,	‘the	mere	existence	of	an	offender	is	
set	up	as	turning	everyone	(else)	into	victims.	Thus	the	lines	are	rigidly	drawn	between	those	
who	belong	to	the	law	(and	the	community)	and	those	who	do	not:	the	outlaws’	(1996:	9).	As	I	
have	 demonstrated,	 hate	 crime	 itself	 has	 been	 examined	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 complex	
manifestation	 of	 this	 dichotomy	 between	 self	 and	 other,	 offering	 a	 complex	 insight	 into	 the	
construction	 of	 identity	 (and	 community)	 through	 the	 infliction	 of	 retributive	 violence.	 Such	
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scholarship	 reveals	 a	novel	manifestation	 through	which	prejudice‐motivated	 crimes	 function	
to	construct	a	community	of	‘us’	via	the	enactment	of	violence	upon	an	‘other’.	In	the	context	of,	
for	example,	homophobic	violence,	such	acts	can	constitute	a	performative	arena	through	which	
to	 construct	 oneself	 as	 heterosexual.	 As	 Mason	 recognises,	 the	 naming	 of	 these	 acts	 as	 hate	
crimes	provides	 an	 important	 expressive	 statement	 about	 community	 that	 resists	 this	 sort	 of	
heteronormative	 excision	 of	 sexual	 difference.	 Similarly,	 I	would	 argue	 here	 that	 child	 sexual	
assault	 demands	 the	 recognition	 that	 such	 offending	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 or	 collapsed	 to	 the	
monstrous	and	abject	 category	of	 the	paedophile.	What	needs	 to	be	 recognised	 instead	 is	 the	
very	communal	nature	of	such	harm,	alongside	a	rejection	of	the	impulse	to	delegate	this	to	an	
abject	other	(‘the	paedophile’).		
	
By	 foreclosing	paedophilia	 from	legal	definitions	of	hate	crime,	 there	 is	a	 risk	 that	we	 further	
entrench	 this	 cultural	 preoccupation	 for	 paedophilia	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	 obscure	 from	
consideration	the	reality	that	child	sexual	assault	is	not	synonymous	with	paedophilia.	Indeed,	
most	 child	 sex	 offenders	 are	 not	 ‘paedophiles’,	 as	 properly	 understood	 (Ardill	 and	 Warlde,	
2009:	258).	By	focusing	on	individual	factors	or	predispositions	that	denote	certain	individuals	
as	 different	 and	 exceptional,	 we	 obscure	 the	 remarkable	 prevalence	 of	 such	 offending.	 This	
prevalence	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 not	 something	 inherent	 to	 certain	 ‘others’	 that	 leads	 them	 to	
commit	 such	 acts,	 but	 that	 ‘we’	 –	 or	 perhaps	 more	 accurately,	 a	 masculinised	 ‘we’	 –	 are	
responsible	 for	 such	 offending.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 that	 we	 are	 child	 sex	 offenders.	 Through	 our	
fixation	 with	 the	 category	 of	 the	 paedophile,	 however,	 this	 troubling	 reality	 is	 conveniently	
erased	and	disavowed.	Further,	naming	an	act	as	a	hate	crime	is,	following	Mason,	an	important	
emotional	statement	that	serves	to	delegitimise	the	motivation	that	underpins	such	acts.	In	the	
case	 of	 racism,	 sexism,	 homophobia	 and	 so	 on,	 the	 import	 of	 this	 is	 obvious.	 However,	 in	 a	
context	in	which	paedophilia	as	a	category	of	criminality	has	come	to	be	understood	as	abject	
par	 excellence,	 there	 are	 dangers	 that	 arise	 from	 denying	 that	 acts	 motivated	 by	 prejudice	
against	this	class	of	offenders	meet	the	requirements	of	legal	definitions	of	hate	crime.	This	need	
only	 be	 witnessed	 via	 the	 array	 of	 harms	 that	 child	 sex	 offenders	 released	 back	 into	 the	
community	 can	 experience.	At	 the	 same	 time	 that	we	 repudiate	 child	 sexual	 abuse,	 I	 contend	
that	 there	 remains	 a	 need	 to	 resist	 the	 urge	 to	 simultaneously	 foreclose	 a	 capacity	 to	
understand	retributive	violence	on	the	basis	of	paedophilia	as	a	legally	recognised	form	of	hate	
crime.	
	
Conclusion	
Scott	 writes	 that	 ‘the	 appearance	 of	 a	 new	 identity	 is	 not	 inevitable	 or	 determined,	 not	
something	that	was	always	there	simply	waiting	to	be	expressed’	(1998:	65).	That	is	to	say,	it	is	
‘not	something	that	will	always	exist	in	the	form	it	was	given	in	a	particular	political	movement	
or	at	a	particular	historical	moment’	(1998:	65).	Categories	of	identity	(including	the	category	of	
the	 paedophile)	 are	 contingent	 upon	 particular	 political	 or	 historical	 contexts.	 As	 I	 have	
demonstrated	in	this	article,	a	particular	trajectory	of	disgust	underpins	contemporary	attitudes	
to	paedophilia.	Through	this,	I	have	sought	to	offer	a	context	in	which	to	render	meaningful	the	
contemporary	aversion	for	paedophilia.	Since	the	1970s,	during	which	time	child	sexual	assault	
was	 commonly	 silenced	 or	 trivialised,	 the	 child	 protection	 lobby	 and	 feminists	 have	 made	
important	 strides	 in	 bringing	 to	 light	 the	 prevalent	 nature	 of	 this	 form	 of	 victimisation	
(Angelides	2004).	One	consequence	of	this	has	been	an	increased	repulsion	for	those	who	have	
been	 responsible	 for	 such	 conduct.	 However,	 while	 denunciation	 for	 paedophilia	 is	 both	
important	and	necessary,	a	growing	moral	panic	surrounding	this	is	not	without	consequence.	
This	 can	 be	 witnessed	 via	 retributive	 or	 vigilante	 violence	 that	 many	 convicted	 child	 sexual	
offenders	–	and	others	suspected	as	such	–	experience	upon	their	release	from	prison.		
	
The	argument	advanced	throughout	this	article	is	not,	it	should	be	emphasised,	an	endorsement	
of	 greater	 punitiveness	 towards	 people	 who	 perform	 vigilante	 violence	 against	 paedophiles.	
Dave	McDonald:	The	Politics	of	Hate	Crime:	Neoliberal	Vigilance,	Vigilantism	and	the	Question	of	Paedophilia	
	
IJCJ&SD					77	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2014	3(1)	
Along	 with	 Mason	 (2009c),	 I	 am	 cognisant	 of	 the	 contradictions	 –	 the	 possibilities	 and	
limitations	 –	 that	 hate	 crime	 as	 a	 concept	 presents.	 It	 can	 be	 simultaneously	 socially	
progressive,	 while	 also	 resembling	 or	 reinforcing	 the	 punitive	 turn	 that	 this	 article	 has	
examined.	Thus,	my	claim	is	not	for	a	more	draconian	stance	towards	vigilante	violence.	To	the	
contrary,	the	contemporary	neoliberal	state	is	already	punitive	and	draconian	when	it	comes	to	
crime.	As	 I	 have	demonstrated,	 this	 is	 particularly	 pronounced	 in	 the	 context	 of	 paedophiles.	
Instead,	what	this	article	seeks	to	advocate	is	a	need	to	recognise	and	identify	the	unique	hatred	
that	 accompanies	 paedophilia,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 troubling	 and	 disturbing	 trend	 in	 which	
individualisation,	 responsiblisation	 and	 vigilance	 translates	 into	 vigilantism.	 Alongside	 this	 is	
the	conceptual	imperative	to	be	able	to	read	or	recognise	this	violence	as	hate,	and	the	complex	
and	 contradictory	 impulses	 that	 seek	 to	 deny	 it	 as	 such.	 In	 the	 absence	of	 doing	 so,	 vigilante	
violence	 against	 actual	 or	 suspected	 ‘paedophiles’	 –	 such	 as	 that	 as	 experienced	 by	 Bijan	
Ebrahimi	–	appears	troublingly	likely.		
	
Further	 to	 this,	 what	 requires	 underscoring	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 increased	 hysteria	 regarding	
convicted	child	sex	offenders	is	 itself	often	misplaced,	 instilling	a	 false	sense	of	security	to	the	
public.	As	Barnes	notes,	this	diverts	attention	from	the	‘individual	who	presents	as	a	decent	law‐
abiding	family	man’	(cited	in	Ardill	and	Wardle	2009:	258).	My	argument	is	not	that	paedophilia	
should	be	 condoned,	but	 that	 a	more	 troubling	 consequence	may	arise	 from	 the	 trajectory	of	
disgust	chronicled	throughout	the	article.	Foremost	amongst	 these	potentials	 is	 the	risk	of	re‐
affirming	a	cultural	obliviousness	to	this	otherwise	law	abiding	and	‘respectable’	family	man.			
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1		An	earlier	version	of	this	article	was	presented	at	the	Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy	Conference	at	QUT	in	2013	
(see	McDonald	2013).	I	am	grateful	to	the	participants	who	engaged	with	it	in	this	forum,	as	well	as	the	anonymous	
reviewers	for	their	insightful	comments	on	this	extended	version.	
2		Throughout	 this	 article	 I	 use	 the	 terms	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 and	 paedophilia	 with	 distinction.	 As	 the	 subsequent	
analysis	goes	on	to	demonstrate,	these	are	not	synonymous	terms.	Conflating	the	phenomenon	of	child	sexual	abuse	
with	the	category	of	the	paedophile,	I	argue,	can	lead	to	dangerous	consequences	in	the	way	in	which	this	form	of	
criminality	is	conceived.	
3		I	am	cognisant	of	the	subtle	but	important	distinction	between	Garland’s	concern	with	‘late	modernity’	(2001),	and	
Wacquant’s	(2009)	much	more	sustained	critique	of	neoliberalism	(see	also	Brown	2011;	Hallsworth	and	Lea	2012;	
and	 Nelkin	 2010).	 I	 am	 broadly	 indebted	 to	 both	 of	 these	 accounts,	 and	 do	 not	 propose	 to	 arbitrate	 their	
distinctions	here.	
4		See	Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312.	On	this	case,	see	also	Mason	(2009a,	2009b).	
5		Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312	at	para	12.	Dunn	had	reported	to	the	psychiatrist	that	he	was	sexually	assaulted	as	a	
child;	however,	this	was	found	to	conflict	with	statements	made	by	Dunn	elsewhere.		
6		Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312	at	para	17.	
7		The	examples	provided	 in	 the	Act	are	as	 follows:	people	of	a	particular	religion,	racial	or	ethnic	origin,	 language,	
sexual	orientation	or	age,	or	having	a	particular	disability.	
8		Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312	at	para	32.	
9		Mason’s	work	on	hate	crime	and	the	question	of	paedophilia	relates	specifically	to	Australian	jurisdictions	where	
the	 courts	 have	 been	 required	 to	 consider	 this	 issue.	 Notwithstanding	 discrepancies	 between	 jurisdictions,	 the	
cultural	 aversion	 that	 surrounds	 paedophilia	 has	 an	 international	 scope	 to	 it.	 Similarly,	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	
declining	penal‐welfare	model,	 alongside	 the	 rise	of	 a	neoliberal	 reorientation	of	 criminal	 justice	 also	 cut	 across	
jurisdictions.	 	 Thus,	 while	 it	 may	 be	 that	 courts	 in	 other	 international	 jurisdictions	 are	 yet	 to	 canvass	whether	
paedophilia	should	constitute	a	ground	of	hate	crime,	the	argument	developed	throughout	this	article	is	not	specific	
to	any	particular	jurisdiction.			
10In	1999	eight	bodies	were	 initially	discovered	 in	barrels	 in	an	unused	bank	vault	 in	the	town	of	Snowtown.	 John	
Bunting	and	Robert	Wagner	were	convicted	of	eleven	and	seven	murders	respectively,	while	two	other	men,	James	
Vlassakis	and	Mark	Heydon,	were	convicted	of	having	accompanied	the	men	in	a	number	of	these	murders.	
	©	The	Author(s)	2014	
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